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Abstract
Perfectionism can be healthy: striving for perfection requires the ability to self-
regulate, namely willpower. This paper formalizes the intuitive relation between
healthy perfectionism and willpower in the presence of temptation. The value of a
menu of options for an individual with limited willpower corresponds to the lower
bound of the value assigned to the same menu by a perfectionist, when temptation
and perfectionism intensities are free to vary. Moreover, the higher the perfectionism
strive, the higher the willpower. The relation between overwhelming temptation and
the Strotz model is a particular case of the result. When there is uncertainty about
temptation, we generalize Dekel and Lipman (2012) providing conditions such that a
preference is represented by a random willpower representation, if and only if, it has
an equivalent random perfectionism representation.
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1 Perfectionism and willpower
Perfectionism refers to a psychological trait characterized by high personal standards,
often coupled with an overly critical evaluation of own performance (Frost et al., 1990).
In the economic literature studying temptation, perfectionism has been proposed as
an explanation for a behavior that is often attributed to naivety. A perfectionist de-
rives utility from the inclusion of a normatively optimal option, although it won’t be
selected later (Kopylov, 2012). Similarly to naivety, this implies a desire for flexi-
bility that is not used in the future (see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), for an
example). Willpower refers to a stock of mental resources that are used to resist temp-
tation (Baumeister et al., 1998). Exerting self-control is costly and individuals give
in to temptations when the cost of resisting is higher than their stock of willpower.
When evaluating a set of options, the individual focuses on the subset containing those
elements whose "cost of temptation" is smaller than her stock of willpower.
This paper shows an unexpected relation between models of choice among menus
accounting for limited willpower and models of perfectionist choice. The value of a
menu according to the willpower model is the lower bound for the value of the menu
according to the perfectionist model, when temptation and perfectionism intensities
are free to vary. In addition, the stock of willpower is equal to the "degree of perfection-
ism". In this sense, perfectionism becomes willpower. In the case of no perfectionism,
the result corresponds to the relation between the temptation model of Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2001), henceforth GP, and the Strotz model. They prove that the Strotz
model arises from GP when the temptation’s intensity becomes overwhelming. Ac-
cording to our approach, the Strotz value of a menu is the lower bound of the value
assigned to the menu by the GP model, when the temptation’s intensity varies. The
previous limiting result is robust to the introduction of stochastic temptation. More-
over, we generalize the result of Dekel and Lipman (2012), showing that a preference
has a sufficiently smooth random willpower representation, if and only if, it has an
equivalent capped random perfectionism representation (see Theorem 4). Hence, we
provide a deeper relation between models of perfectionism and limited willpower with
stochastic temptation. A final application to the dynamic of willpower shows how the
effect of exerting self-control today can influence the stock of willpower tomorrow. If
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willpower depletes with use, a steady-state of (random) self-indulgence arises, although
temptations’ intensity is constant across time. If willpower is "trained" with use, as
suggested in Baumeister et al. (1998), preferences in the steady-state are equivalent
to a pure preference for flexibility.
The paper makes several contributions. The first is technical, since we connect a
well-established literature on subdifferential and -subdifferential calculus (Zalinescu,
2002) to models of choice among menus. The machinery developed in this work and
the techniques developed in subdifferential calculus can be readily applied to other
models of choice among menus, for example, those relaxing the independence axiom
(Ergin and Sarver, 2010; Noor and Takeoka, 2015) and in different areas, such as the
menu-approach to ambiguity (Ahn, 2008; Gajdos et al., 2008) and rational inattention
(De Oliveira et al., 2013; Pennesi, 2015).
Secondly, the link we establish between the two classes of models, one studying
perfectionism and the other willpower, is not a mere technical result. It is moti-
vated by the psychological literature viewing perfectionism as an "adaptive" trait, also
called positive striving (Hamachek, 1978; Stoeber and Otto, 2006). Positive striving
forces individuals to set and pursue high standards, this requires a high capacity of
self-regulation. In turn, the ability to self-regulate is directly related to willpower,
since more willpower generates a higher ability to self-regulate. Therefore, the paper
proposes a formalization of a link that can be found informally in the psychological
literature. The paper also contributes to the growing literature studying models of
choice with limited willpower (Masatlioglu et al., 2011; Ozdenoren et al., 2012). Since
the axiomatic foundation of perfectionism is known (see Kopylov, 2012), the relation
we propose in this work may inform future attempts to lay down the axiomatic foun-
dations of models of limited willpower. Lastly, the model of willpower we introduce
here has alternative interpretations: it can be thought as the first-period choice of an
individual who anticipates choice overload in the second-period (see Frick, 2015), or
anticipates a "satisficing" rule1 (Aleskerov et al., 2007; Manzini et al., 2013). There-
fore, the results of the paper have a wide range of alternative applications and they
1In the satisficing rule of Aleskerov et al. (2007), an individual chooses form a set x according to C(x) =
{p ∈ x : v(p) ≥ δ(x)}. If δ(x) = maxq∈x v(q) − w(x), we recover the willpower representation. In the two-
stage threshold representation of Manzini et al. (2013), the choice rule is C(x) = argmaxp∈x g(p) such that
f(p) ≥ θ(x).
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are useful to study models of choice departing from the "temptation" approach.
1.1 Related literature
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) introduced temptation in a model of choice among menus.
Resisting temptation has a menu-dependent cost and an individual may prefer smaller
to larger menus. Their model includes as a particular case the Strotz’s model: when
the temptation’s intensity becomes overwhelming, the Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
model becomes the Strotz model. We show that this result is a particular case of
a more general relation linking perfectionism and willpower. Perfectionism has been
introduced in Kopylov (2012) to account for the empirical evidence showing a desire
for flexibility in the presence of temptation, for example, buying an expensive monthly
pass for a gym, whereas daily passes would be more convenient given the actual num-
ber of visits (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006). Perfectionism offers an explanation
for the latter behavior that does not rely on naivety.2 A perfectionist benefits from
including normatively optimal options, although those are not selected in the second-
period choice. Dekel and Lipman (2012) introduced a stochastic version of the Strotz
model, where uncertainty affects future temptations. They establish a surprising rela-
tion between the random Strotz and the random GP representations (a generalization
of the GP model with uncertainty about temptation). A preference has a sufficiently
smooth random Strotz representation, if and only if, it has an equivalent random GP
representation. We generalize this equivalence providing conditions such that a pref-
erence has a sufficiently smooth random Strotz with willpower representation, if and
only if, it has a random temptation with perfectionism representation. Concerning the
theoretical literature on willpower, Ozdenoren et al. (2012) modeled dynamic choices
in continuous time where willpower acts as a stock of resources devoted to resist temp-
tation. Two models of choice from menus, Masatlioglu et al. (2011) and Frick (2015),
the latter with a different interpretation, can be interpreted as the choice rules induced
in the second-period by willpower models. In the case of Masatlioglu et al. (2011) with
a menu-independent stock of willpower3 and, in the case of Frick (2015), with a menu-
2A naive individual overestimates his ability to resist temptation.
3In an early version of their paper, Masatlioglu et al. (2011) axiomatized a model of choice among menus
with limited and menu-independent willpower.
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dependent stock. An axiomatization of a model of choice among menus that accounts
for limited willpower is still missing in the literature. This paper contributes to this
goal providing a relation between limited willpower and perfectionism.
2 Temptation, perfectionism and willpower
Let Z be a finite set of prizes, a lottery is an element p of the simplex ∆(Z). A menu
x is a compact, convex and nonempty subset of ∆(Z). The set of all menus is denoted
by X . A preference relation < is defined over X . A representation of a preference <
is a function V : X → R, such that V (x) ≥ V (y), if and only if, x < y.
We begin introducing the Perfectionism representation VP of Kopylov (2012). It
evaluates a menu x ∈ X according to:
VP (x) = max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + kmaxq∈x u(q)
where u, v : ∆(Z) → R are expected utility functions and k > −1. The function u
is interpreted as the normative utility and v as the temptation ranking (v(p) ≥ v(q),
if and only if, p is more tempting than q). The parameter k models the effect of
perfectionism, if k > 0, the individual has a preference for flexibility, i.e. x ∪ y  x <
y, for some x, y ∈ X , (see Kopylov, 2012), even though such flexibility will not be
used in the future.4 A Gul-Pesendorfer (GP) representation VGP is a Perfectionism
representation with k = 0:
VGP (x) = max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)
A Willpower representation evaluates a menu according to:
VW (x) = max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p)
where
B(x; v, w(x)) =
{
p ∈ x : w(x) ≥ max
q∈x v(q)− v(p)
}
4Given sophistication (and other axioms), the second-period choice function associated with VP is
C(x) = argmaxp∈x u(p) + v(p), and it is identical to the choice rule associated with a GP representation.
Perfectionism affects the ex-ante value of a menu, but it does not affect the second-period choice.
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w(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . The value of a menu is equal to the maximum normative
utility u achievable on a restricted menu containing the elements whose cost, in terms of
resisting temptation, maxq∈x v(q)− v(p), is smaller than the stock of willpower w(x).
If w(x) = w ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X , we call the previous model the Limited Willpower
model. If w(x) = w = 0 for all x ∈ X , the Willpower model becomes the Strotz model
(Strotz, 1956),
VS(x) = max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)
where B(x; v, 0) = {p ∈ x : v(p) ≥ maxq∈x v(q)}. The model of willpower acts as a
bridge between a pure preference for flexibility in the sense of Kreps (1979) and the
overwhelming temptation of Strotz. Indeed, for large enough w(x), B(x; v, w(x)) = x,
hence VW (x) = maxp∈x u(p) as in Kreps, whereas for w(x) = 0, VW (x) = VS(x). As
anticipated in the introduction, the willpower model can be alternatively interpreted
as a first-period choice of an individual who anticipates choice overload (Frick, 2015),
or anticipates a "satisficing" rule (Aleskerov et al., 2007), or anticipates a two-stage
with threshold choice rule (Manzini et al., 2013).
It is well known (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001) that the Strotz representation is a
limiting case of the GP representation:
lim
λ→∞
[
max
p∈x [u(p) + λv(p)]− λmaxq∈x v(q)
]
= max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)
When the intensity of the temptation becomes overwhelming, the individual antic-
ipates her inability to resist and she only considers the restricted menu containing
elements that maximize the temptation utility. The main result of the paper follows
from the observation that the relation between the GP and the Strotz representation
can be rewritten as (see Eq. (2)):
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)
]
= max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)
The interpretation of the previous expression is the following: the Strotz’s evaluation
of a menu x ∈ X is equal to the lower bound of the evaluation of the same menu
according to GP, when the intensity of the temptation is free to vary. In other words,
the Strotz value of a menu corresponds to the worst possible value assigned by a GP
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to a menu, when the temptation intensity changes. Using the previous consideration,
we can relate the perfectionism and the willpower models.
As for the GP case, one can be interested in the lower bound for the value of a
menu, when the intensity of the temptation and the intensity of perfectionism vary.
Formally, for a given x ∈ X , consider the expression:
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q) +
1
λ
kmax
q∈x u(q)
]
The following result shows that this value is equal to the value assigned by the
willpower representation to x, with a particular stock of willpower.5
Theorem 1. For all x ∈ X , if kmaxq∈x u(q) ≥ 0,
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)] +
1
λ
kmax
q∈x u(q)
]
= max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p)
where w(x) = kmaxq∈x u(q).
It follows that the lowest value of a menu x for a perfectionist corresponds to
the value given by the willpower model, where the stock of willpower is the "value of
perfectionism" kmaxq∈x u(q). In this sense: perfectionism becomes willpower. Suppose
maxq∈x u(q) ≥ 0, since, B(x; v, w(x)) = {p ∈ x : kmaxq∈x u(q) ≥ maxq∈x v(q)− v(p)},
the larger the craving for perfectionism, parametrized by k, the larger is the stock of
willpower. As a limiting case, for a large enough value of perfectionism, for example,
kmaxq∈x u(q) ≥ maxp∈x(maxq∈x v(q)−v(p)), we have B(x; v, w(x)) = x and the value
of x is equal to that assigned by a pure preference for flexibility representation. The
previous result provides information about the axiomatic foundation of the willpower
model. Being a particular case of the perfectionism representation, it has to satisfy
the Independence and the Perfection Set-Betweenness axiom6 of Kopylov (2012). A
particular case of Theorem 1 offers a new version of the relation between Strotz and
the GP model.
5The proof follows directly from Theorem 2.
6For all p ∈ ∆(Z) and x, y ∈ Mp, x < y implies {p} < x < x ∪ y < y. Where Mp =
{x ∈ X : p ∈ x, {p} < {q} ,∀q ∈ x}.
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Corollary 1. If k = 0, i.e. no-perfectionism,
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)]
]
= max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)
where B(x; v, 0) = {p ∈ x : v(p) ≥ maxq∈x v(q)}.
The link with the overwhelming approach of GP follows from Eq. (2). Indeed,
lim
λˆ→∞
[
max
p∈x [u(p) + λˆv(p)]− λˆmaxq∈x v(q)]
]
= lim
1
λ
→0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)]
]
= inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)]
]
with λˆ = 1λ and the last equality is due to Eq. (2). Intuitively, the equivalence is due
to the "cost" formulation of the GP model. The lower value of GP coincides with the
intensity of temptation going to infinity.
3 Generalized healthy perfectionism
To account for more general models we introduce the Generalized Healthy Perfection-
ism representation VHP . It evaluates a menu according to:
VHP (x) = max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x)
where u, v : ∆(Z)→ R are expected utility functions, θ : X → R+ with θ(x) ≥ θ(y) if
y ⊆ x. The interpretation of u and v is the same of the perfectionism representation.
The only difference is in the function θ : X → R+. Monotonicity with respect to
set inclusion implies a premium for flexibility, although such flexibility is not used
in the second-period.7 An example of θ(x) is the non-linear perfectionism θ(x) =
f(maxp∈x u(x)), for some monotone f : R → R+. The case of θ(x) = kmaxp∈x u(p)
intersects the model of Kopylov (2012) only if kmaxp∈x u(p) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X .
Differently from the perfectionist representation, the additional value of larger menus
is not necessarily due to the inclusion of normatively optimal options. For example,
7The second-period choice rule associated with the HP representation, given "sophistication", is C(x) =
argmaxp∈x[u(p)+v(p)], the same rule of GP and the perfectionist model of Kopylov (2012). Then, including
additional options in the menu may increase the first-period value but it does not affect the second-period
choice.
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consider θ(x) = l(x) where l is the Lebesgue measure. Larger menus are more valuable
regardless of their normative content.
A generalized healthy perfectionism representation may violate the independence
axiom,8 unless the function θ is linear with respect to mixtures of menus, i.e. θ(αx+(1−
α)y) = αθ(x) + (1−α)θ(y). It may also violate the Perfection Set-Betweenness axiom
of Kopylov (2012). Indeed, consider p, q ∈ ∆(Z) with u(p) > u(q) and v(q) > v(p)
and u(p) − (v(q) − v(p)) ≥ u(q). The lottery p is perfect in the menu {p, q}, hence
Perfection Set Betweenness requires p < {p, q}. However, assume 0 = θ(p) < θ({p, q}),
then VHP (p) = u(p) < maxp,q u(p) − (v(q) − v(p)) + θ({p, q}) = VHP ({p, q}) Hence,
{p, q} is preferred to p although p is "perfect" in {p, q}. The previous preference is
consistent with a "challenge against oneself" explanation. The individual benefits from
the inclusion of a tempting option q in the menu, since she may enjoy the challenge of
resisting temptation.
The following theorem is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 2. For all x ∈ X ,
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)] +
1
λ
θ(x)
]
= max
p∈B(x;v,θ(x))
u(p)
As for the perfectionism representation, the lower bound of the value assigned to a
menu by the generalized healthy perfectionism is given by the willpower representation.
In addition, the stock of willpower is identical to the perfectionism value and again
perfectionism becomes willpower. The result can be used to better understand the
axiomatic foundation of the willpower model. Since HP may violate independence
and perfectionist set-betweenness, the same holds for the willpower representation. A
particularly interesting case of Theorem 2 concerns the relation between the Limited
Willpower model w(x) = w for all x ∈ X and perfectionism. Let θ(x) = w for all
x ∈ X , then the HP representation is a "perturbation" of the GP representation:
VHP (x) = max
p∈x [u(p)− (maxq∈x v(q)− v(p)− w)]
where the "perfectionism" value w decreases the cost of resisting temptation by a fixed
8For all x, y, z ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1], x < y implies αx+ (1− α)z < αy + (1− α)z.
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amount w ≥ 0. In this case:
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q)] +
1
λ
w
]
= max
p∈B(x;v,w)
u(p)
where B(x; v, w) = {p ∈ x : w ≥ maxq∈x v(q)− v(p)}. Limited willpower arises from
a very specific case of healthy perfectionism. This result offers an indirect proof that
the model of limited willpower satisfies the Independence and the Set Between axiom
of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
In general, the utility of the willpower representation is a lower bound for the gener-
alized healthy perfectionism, when the perfectionism value and the stock of willpower
coincide (by point a. in Proposition 2):
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x) ≥ maxp∈B(x;v,θ(x))u(p)
The inequality is preserved if we let, as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), the intensity
of the temptation and perfectionism to go to infinity.
Corollary 2. For all x ∈ X ,
lim
λ→∞
[
max
p∈x [u(p) + λv(p)]− λmaxq∈x v(q) + λθ(x)
]
≥ max
p∈B(x;v,θ(x))
u(p)
Differently from the temptation and self-control case θ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , the
previous inequality can be strict. Hence, the value of a menu for an overwhelmed
perfectionist can be strictly larger than the value of the same menu for a willpower
representation (with perfectionism equal to willpower).
4 Uncertain temptation
Uncertainty concerning the temptation that will strike in the second period is de-
scriptively advantageous and technically useful (see Dekel and Lipman, 2012, for a
discussion). The Strotz model is not continuous and small variations in the commit-
ment utility u may drastically change preferences. Uncertainty resolves this issue and
it is often assumed in applications. Let U a subset of Rn and µ a probability measure
on U endowed with the Borel σ-algebra. The Random GP with Healthy Perfectionism
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(RP) model is given by the following:
VRP (x) =
∫
U
[
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x)
]
µ(dv)
with θ(x) ≥ θ(y) if y ⊆ x. The individual is uncertain about the "type" of temptation
that she will face, whereas the perfectionism value is certain. This assumption is
plausible given the interpretation of perfectionism as a force that affects the first-period
value. Since uncertainty concerns the second period choice, it is natural to assume a
deterministic value for perfectionism. If θ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , the RP model becomes
the Random GP model of Dekel and Lipman (2012). A similar extension that accounts
for uncertainty of future temptations in the Willpower model gives the Random Strotz
with Willpower (RS) representation:
VRSW (x) =
∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p)µ(dv)
where
B(x; v, w(x)) =
{
p ∈ x : w(x) ≥ max
q∈x v(q)− v(p)
}
When w(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , the model corresponds to the random Strotz model of
Dekel and Lipman (2012). The next theorem is a generalization of Theorem 2:
Theorem 3. For all x ∈ X ,
∫
U
inf
λ>0
[
max
p∈x [u(p) +
1
λ
v(p)]− 1
λ
max
q∈x v(q) +
1
λ
θ(x)
]
µ(dv) =
∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,θ(x))
u(p)µ(dv)
The interpretation of the expression on the left-hand side is the following: it is the
expected lower bound for the evaluation of a menu as the temptation and perfectionism
intensities are free to vary. A special case of the previous result implies that the limit
of the random GP model is given by the random Strotz model.
Corollary 3. If θ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , i.e. no-perfectionism,
lim
λ→∞
∫
U
[
max
p∈x [u(p) + λv(p)]− λmaxq∈x v(q)
]
µ(dv) =
∫
U
max
x∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)µ(dv)
where B(x; v, 0) = {p ∈ x : v(p) ≥ maxq∈x v(q)}.
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4.1 Perfectionism and random willpower
In the last section we prove that, under uncertainty, the relation between perfectionism
and willpower goes beyond the results above. Indeed, we will extend the result of
Dekel and Lipman (2012) to random perfectionism and willpower. They showed that
a preference has a sufficiently smooth random Strotz representation, if and only if,
it has a random GP representation. We prove that the result can be generalized
to account for willpower and perfectionism, when a condition on the perfectionism
representation is met. A preference < has a sufficiently smooth RS with willpower
representation, if and only if, it has a capped9 RGP with perfectionism representation.
To illustrate one direction of the result consider
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)dt
it is a RS with willpower w(x) and a uniform intensity of temptation v + tu and
t ∼ U [0, 1]. Smaller values of t correspond to a stronger intensity of the temptation.
For each t, the set B(x; v+tu, w(x)) is larger than the corresponding set of the random
Strotz representation, B(x; v + tu, 0). Therefore,
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p) ≥ max
p∈B(x;v+tu,0)
u(p)
and for each t ∈ [0, 1] there exists a positive number θt(x) such that, maxp∈B(x;v+tu,w(x)) u(p) =
maxp∈B(x;v+tu,0) u(p) + θt(x). Each willpower representation assigns a higher value to
a menu than its related Strotz representation. When aggregating over the different
intensities of the temptation we have:
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)dt =
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,0)
u(p)dt+ θ(x) (1)
where θ(x) =
∫ 1
0 θt(x)dt. By Dekel and Lipman (2012), the integral on the right-hand
side of Eq. (1) is equal to a GP representation, hence
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)dt = max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x)
9See the definition before Theorem 4.
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a (random) GP with perfectionism representation. Adding uncertainty on the temp-
tation v gives
∫
U
(∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)dt
)
µ(dv) =
∫
U
(
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x)
)
µ(dv)
To generalize the previous argument, we define a Continuous Intensity RS withWillpower
the following representation:
VCI(x) =
∫
U
(∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)f(t|v)dt
)
µ(dv)
where f(t|v) is a lower-semicontinuous density10 (see Dekel and Lipman, 2012, for
details). We have the following result:
Proposition 1. Every Continuous Intensity RS with willpower has a RGP with per-
fectionism representation.
Differently from the random Strotz case, it is not true that any RGP with perfec-
tionism has a RS with willpower representation. For example, consider the healthy
perfectionist value of a menu x = {p, q} with v(p) = v(q) = m, then VHP (x) =
maxp∈x u(p) + θ(x). Let u(p) > u(q) then, if θ(x) > 0 and θ(p) = 0, x P p, since
VHP (x) = u(p) + θ(x) > u(p) = VHP (p). Now consider a RS with willpower, VRSW =∫
U maxp∈B(x;v,w(x)) u¯(p)µ(dv), with u¯(p) > u¯(q) and v(p) = v(q) = m. For any stock of
willpower w(x) ≥ 0, VRSW (p) = u¯(p) = maxp∈x u¯(p) =
∫
U maxp∈B(x;v,w(x)) u¯(p)µ(dv) =
VRSW (x). Then, p ∼RSW x, which is inconsistent with the perfectionist ranking. Per-
fectionism strive can be strong enough to generate a strict preference for flexibility,
whereas willpower cannot.
The next theorem shows that the previous example captures the unique case in
which the two representations can differ. We say that a RGP with perfectionism VRP
is capped if
max
p∈x u(p) ≥
∫
U
(
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x)
)
µ(dv) ∀x ∈ X
The value assigned to a menu by a capped "perfectionism" is bounded by a pure
preference for flexibility.
10A density f(t|v) is lower-semicontinuous if the sets {t : f(t) > k} are open for all k.
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Theorem 4. A preference < has capped RGP with perfectionism representation, if
and only if, it has a Continuous Intensity RS with willpower representation.
Theorem 4 closes the gap between random willpower and random perfectionism
showing that the two are essentially equivalent when perfectionism is "bounded" by a
pure preference for flexibility. The previous result can be useful to study the axiomatic
foundations of the two models. As in the case of Dekel and Lipman (2012), the two
models are observationally distinguishable if one can observe both choices among and
from menus.
5 An application to the dynamic of willpower
and perfectionism
In this last section we consider a dynamic application of the RS with willpower
model, in the recursive setting of Gul and Pesendorfer (2007). We define inductively
Z1 = K(∆(C)) and for t > 1, Zt = K(∆(C×Zt−1)), where K(M) is the set of compact
subsets of a set M and C is the set of consumption. Standard results imply the exis-
tence of a compact metric Z∞ which is homeomorphic to K(∆(C×Z∞)) (see Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2007, for details), with Z∞ representing infinite-horizon menus. Prefer-
ences < are defined on ∆(C × Z∞) and a lottery p ∈ ∆(C × Z∞) gives consumption
c in the current period and a continuation menu z ∈ Z∞. We assume that elements
in the consumption set C are represented by a pair (c, d), where d is a tempting good
and c is not. Lastly, we allow preferences to depend on a state s ∈ S, hence we have
a family {<s}s∈S . Let consider a recursive RS with willpower
V (z, s) =
∫ 1
0
max
(c,d,x)∈B(z,v+lu,w(s))
U(c, d, x, s)dl
where U(c, d, x, s) = u(c, d) + δV (x, s′). We assumed that the only parameter de-
pending on the state s is the stock of willpower. For example, we can assume the
existence of a function σ : S → R+ with w(s) = σ(s)w and w ≥ 0. For example, let
s = max(c,d,x)∈z v(d)− v(d∗), where d∗ is the yesterday’s consumption of the tempting
good. If σ(s) is decreasing, resisting temptation yesterday decreases the amount of
willpower today, modeling willpower as a limited resource. With less willpower, the
ability to resist temptation is lower, leading to higher consumption of the tempting
14
good d today. If the function σ(s) goes to 0 as s increases, the individual enters a
steady state where σ(s)w = 0 and she is "trapped" in a (random) self-indulgent be-
havior. The nature of the steady-state is different from the overwhelming temptation,
since temptations’ intensity is constant over time. The random self-indulgent steady-
state follows from the stock of willpower being used up. Decreasing willpower, also
diminishes the value of perfectionism in the associated representation (By Proposition
1 there is one):
V (z, s) = max
(c,d,x,s)∈z
[
u(c, d) + v(d) + δV (x, s′)
]− max
(c,d,x,s)∈z
v(d) + θ(s, z)
resisting temptation yesterday warns the individual of the drawbacks of larger menus.
If willpower depletes completely, θ(s, z) = 0 and the value of perfectionism disappears.
In the case of an increasing function σ(s), we model how individuals build willpower.
Resisting temptation yesterday increases the stock of willpower today, as predicted by
the Strength Model of Self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998). Willpower behaves as a
muscle, it can be "trained" and become stronger. Again, a steady-state can be reached
if the stock of willpower is big enough, in this case the individual has a pure preference
for flexibility:
V (z, s) = max
(c,d,x)∈z
U(c, d, x, s)
At the same time, increasing willpower over time increases the value of perfection-
ism θ(s, z) in the associated representation. Resisting temptation produces a form of
"perfectionism" addiction, the individual assigns an ever greater value to perfectionism
(actually flexibility), ending in a pure preference for flexibility.
6 Conclusion
The Strotz model corresponds to a limiting case of the Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
model in which temptation becomes overwhelming. This result is a particular case
of a more general relation between perfectionism and willpower. When temptation
and perfectionism vary, the lower bound for the value of a menu is given by the value
attached to the menu by a model of willpower. Moreover, the stock of willpower is
exactly equal to the value of perfectionism. The result is preserved when temptation
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is uncertain. In addition, we extend the link between perfectionism and willpower
providing conditions for the equivalence of the RS with willpower representation and
the RGP with perfectionism representation.
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Appendix A: -subdifferentials
Let X be a locally convex vector space and f : X → R a convex function. Let
dom f = {x ∈ X : f(x) < +∞}. f is proper if dom f 6= ∅ and f > −∞ for all x. The
-directional derivative of f at v in the direction u is given for a fixed  ≥ 0 by (see
Zalinescu (2002))
f ′(v, u) , inf
t>0
f(v + tu)− f(v) + 
t
The -subdifferential of f at v ∈ X, ∂f : X ⇒ X∗, is defined as
∂f(v) = {x∗ ∈ X∗ : 〈u− v, x∗〉 ≤ f(v)− f(u) + }
If f is proper and convex, the following properties hold for every  ≥ 0:
Proposition 2 (Zalinescu (2002)).
(a). f ′(v, u) ≤ f(v + u)− f(v) + , for all u ∈ X.
(b). f ′(v, u) = maxx∗∈∂f(v)〈u, x∗〉.
(c.) If f is sublinear, ∂f(v) = {x∗ ∈ ∂f(0) : 〈v, x∗〉 ≥ f(v)− }, where ∂f = ∂0f is
the standard subdifferential.
(d). 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2 <∞ implies
f ′0(v, u) ≤ f ′1(v, u) ≤ f ′2(v, u)
If f : X → R is proper and convex and v ∈ dom f . Then for every u ∈ X
f ′0(v;u) = lim
t→0
f(v + tu)− f(v)
t
= inf
t>0
f(v + tu)− f(u)
t
(2)
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof. Of Theorem 2. For a fixed menu x ∈ X , consider Vx(v) = maxp∈x v(p), as a
function Vx(v) : Rn → R. The expression maxp∈x[u(p)−λ(maxq∈x v(q)−v(p))]+λθ(x)
can be rewritten as
maxp∈x[v(p) + 1λu(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)] + θ(x)
1/λ (3)
Defining  = θ(x) and λˆ = 1/λ, the left-hand side of the equation in the statement
becomes
inf
λˆ>0
maxp∈x[v(p) + λˆu(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)] + 
λˆ
The previous expression is the -subderivative of the function Vx(v) = maxp∈x v(q) in
the direction u ∈ Rn (see Appendix A) and we denoted it by V ′x(v, u). By Property
(b). in Proposition 2,
V ′x(v, u) = max
k∈∂Vx(v)
u(k)
By point (c). in Prop. 2, ∂Vx(v) = {k ∈ ∂Vx(0n) : v(k) ≥ Vx(v)− }, but ∂Vx(0n) =
cox = x, since x ∈ X is compact and convex. Therefore, ∂Vx(v) = {p ∈ x : v(p) ≥ Vx(v)− }
and V ′x(v, u) = maxp∈B(x,v,) u(p), as desired.
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Proof. Of Corollary 2. The result follows from
lim
λ→∞
[
max
p∈x [u(p)− λ(maxq∈x v(q)− v(p))] + λθ(x)
]
= lim
λ→∞
λ
[
max
p∈x [λ
−1u(p)− (max
q∈x v(y)− v(q))] + θ(x)
]
= lim
λˆ→0
[ 1
λˆ
(
max
p∈x [v(p) + λˆu(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)] + θ(x)
)]
where in the last equality λˆ = λ−1. To conclude,
lim
λˆ→0
[ 1
λˆ
(
max
p∈x [v(p) + λˆu(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)] + θ(x)
)]
≥ inf
λˆ>0
[ 1
λˆ
(
max
p∈x [v(p) + λˆu(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)] + θ(x)
)]
= max
p∈B(x;v,θ(x))
u(p)
where the last equality follows from Theorem 2.
Proof. Of Corollary 3.
lim
λ→∞
∫
U
[
max
p∈x [u(p)− λ(maxq∈x v(q)− v(p))]
]
µ(dv)
= lim
λ→∞
λ
(∫
U
max
p∈x v(p) + λ
−1u(p)−max
q∈x v(q)dµ(dv)
)
= lim
λˆ→0
∫
U
maxp∈x v(p) + λˆu(p)−maxq∈x v(q)
λˆ
µ(dv)
=
∫
U
lim
λˆ→0
maxp∈x v(p) + λˆu(p)−maxq∈x v(q)
λˆ
µ(dv)
=
∫
U
inf
λˆ>0
maxp∈x v(p) + λˆu(p)−maxq∈x v(q)
λˆ
µ(dv)
=
∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)dµ(v)
where the third equality follows from the Dominated Convergence theorem, the forth
equality from convexity of the function maxp∈x v(q) and Eq. (2) and the last equality
from Theorem 3.
To prove Proposition 1, we need the following result:
Proposition 3. For all w(x) ≥ 0, there exists θ(x) ≥ 0, such that∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p)µ(dv) =
∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)µ(dv) + θ(x)
Proof. Of Proposition 3. By point (d). of Proposition 2, for all x ∈ X , w(x) ≥ 0
implies
max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p) ≥ max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)
Then, for each v ∈ V, there exists θv(x) ≥ 0 such that
max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p) = max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p) + θv(x)
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Integrating over U ,∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,0)
u(p)µ(dv) + θ(x) =
∫
U
max
p∈B(x;v,w(x))
u(p)µ(dv)
where θ(x) =
∫
U θv(x)µ(dv).
Proof. Of Proposition 1. For each x ∈ X ,∫
U
(∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)f(t|v)dt
)
µ(dv)
=
∫
U
(∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,0)
u(p)f(t|v)dt+ θ(x)
)
µ(dv)
=
∫
U
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q) + θ(x)µ(dv)
Where the first equality follows from Proposition 3 and the second from Dekel and
Lipman (2012, Th. 2).
Proof. Of Theorem 4. By Dekel and Lipman (2012),∫
U
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)µ(dv) + θ(x) =
∫
U
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,0)
u(p)dtµ(dv) + θ(x)
Then, we have to find w(x) ≥ 0 such that
θ(x) =
∫
U
(∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w(x))
u(p)dt−
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,0)
u(p)dt
)
µ(dv)
The range of the right-hand side of the previous equation as w(x) varies is [0, k], where 0
occurs for w(x) = 0 and k = maxp∈x u(p)−(
∫
U maxp∈x[u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)µ(dv)).
Since VRP is capped, θ(x) ∈ [0, k]. For each w(x) , w¯ define <w¯ in the following way:
x <w¯ y, if and only if,∫
U
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w¯)
u(p)dtµ(dv) ≥
∫
U
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(y;v+tu,w¯)
u(p)dtµ(dv)
clearly, all <w¯ agree on singletons. Let p(w¯) ∈ x such that
u(p(w¯)) =
∫
U
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w¯)
u(p)dtµ(dv)
then u(p(w¯)) ≥ u(p(w¯′)) if w¯ ≥ w¯′ and w¯ 7→ u(p(w¯)) is monotone. By the cap condition
θ(x) ∈ [0, u(p(wˆ))−u(p(0))], for wˆ(x) great enough. Suppose that limw¯n→w¯+ u(p(w¯n)) >
limw¯n→w¯− u(p(w¯n)) and consider <w′,< on singletons (the coincides for all w′). This
implies either p(w¯n) < q and q  p(w¯) or q < p(w¯n) and p(w¯)  q, for some q ∈ ∆(Z),
both contradict continuity. Then there exists w∗ such that θ(x) = u(p(w∗)− u(p(0)).
By the definition of p(w∗),∫
U
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,w∗)
u(p)dtµ(dv) =
∫
U
∫ 1
0
max
p∈B(x;v+tu,0)
u(p)dtµ(dv) + θ(x)
=
∫
U
max
p∈x [u(p) + v(p)]−maxq∈x v(q)µ(dv) + θ(x)
as desired. To see the opposite, notice that the proof of Proposition 1 implies that the
RGP with perfectionism associated with the RS with willpower is capped.
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